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Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board and
Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
Court: First Amendment Limits on Ethical
Restrictions of Judicial Candidates' Speech
L Introduction
Canon 7B(l)(c) of the 1972 American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Code of Judicial Conduct,' which seeks to regulate the speech of candi-
dates for judicial office, states:
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial of-
fice (c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or
misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other
fact. 2
In 1990, the ABA rewrote Canon 7 and renamed it Canon 5 Canon 5
provides that candidates
shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate
with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court; or (iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate
or an opponent. 3
1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(l)(c) (1972).
2. Id.
3. Id. Canon 5A(3)(d) (amended 1990); see also MODEL CANONS OFJUDICIALETHICS
Canon 30 (1924) (containing original model canon for judicial campaign speech). Canon
30 states:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make
for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices
of the appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his
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Although courts have yet to review the constitutionality of Canon 5, several
courts have reviewed the constitutionality of Canon 7 ' In Buckley v
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit6 held that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67B(1)(c),7 which
substantially embodied the language of Canon 7,8 violated the First
Amendment. 9 Judge Posner wrote for the court that the Rule's overinclus-
ive language impermissibly interfered with the speech "market."" The
Buckley decision conflicts with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit's interpretation of the constitutionality of Canon 7 in Stretton
v Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court."
conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do
nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will
administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
Id.
4. See infra notes 28-137 and accompanying text (discussing cases that address
Canon 7).
5. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
6. Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993). Judge
Posner wrote the opinion in which the Seventh Circuit reversed the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 231. District Judge James H. Alesia had
upheld Illinois's disciplinary Rule despite potential First Amendment problems. Buckley
v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 801 F Supp. 83, 102 (N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'd, 997 F.2d
224 (7th Cir. 1993).
7 ILL. REv STAT. ch. 110A, para. 67B(1)(c) (1993).
8. Id. Paragraph 67B(1)(c) states:
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office filled by
election or retention (c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent
his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact; provided, however,
that he may announce his views on measures to improve the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt
on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him.
Id.
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that Congress shall make no law abridging
freedom of speech).
10. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229.
11. 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
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In Stretton,12 the Third Circuit construed Canon 713 narrowly to
conclude that Canon 7 did not violate judicial candidates' free speech
rights. 4 The Third Circuit reasoned that courts should interpret Canon 7
to prohibit candidates from expressing opimons only on issues likely to
come before them as judges."5 Although the Buckley court took notice of
the Stretton decision, the Seventh Circuit chose not to follow Stretton16
and thus created a split in the circuits on the constitutionality of Can-
on 7 17 This split has provided the United States Supreme Court with a
reason to review the constitutionality of Canon 7 18 At the same time, the
ABA's replacement of Canon 7 in 1990 with a more narrowly worded
provision on campaign ethics may have signaled the demise of the 1972
provision, at least in the eyes of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility 19 However, the 1990 revisions did not
remedy all of the problems that courts, such as the Buckley court,
discovered in the 1972 Canon.2"
In order to give proper background for the Buckley and Stretton
decisions, Part II of this Note reviews the history of court challenges to
Canon 7 21 After a review of Stretton in Part II,' Part IV analyzes the
successful challenge to Canon 7 in Buckley and provides a close review of
12. Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
13. See 204 PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1979) (adopting language of
Canon 7 of 1972 Model Code).
14. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 143 (upholding Canon 7).
15. Id.
16. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993)
(recognizing tension with Stretton decision).
17 Id.
18. Id.
19. See LISA L. MILORD, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
JUDICIAL CODE 50-51 (1992) (discussing reasoning behind major changes that Committee
made to Canon 7B(i)(c) of 1972 Code in drafting 1990 Code).
20. See infra notes 200-14 and accompanying text (explaining that 1990 Code's
Canon 5 failed to remedy criticisms of Buckley court).
21. See infra notes 28-68 and accompanying text (reviewing court challenges to
Canon 7).
22. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text (reviewing Stretton decision).
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the Seventh Circuit's reasomng and use of authority ' Part V applies the
reasoning in Buckley and Stretton to a candidate's campaign statements,
analyzes the rationales of the two decisions, and concludes that Buckley is
the better decided of the two cases.24
Next, Part VI turns to a review of the 1990 alterations of Canon 7 and
the reasomng that spurred those changes.' Part VII addresses whether the
1990 Model Code's Canon 5 remedies all of the constitutional shortcomings
of Canon 7 that the Seventh Circuit raised in Buckley 26 Finally, Part VII
concludes that because the changes in the 1990 Model Code remedied some
but not all of the Buckley court's constitutional criticisms of Canon 7, the
1990 Model Code requires further revisions.27
H. Court Challenges to Canon 7 of the 1972 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct
As of 1990, twenty-five states had adopted verbatim Canon 7B(1)(c)
of the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 8 Several courts have
addressed the constitutionality of that Canon.29  In J C.J.D v
R.J C.R.,1° the Kentucky Supreme Court declared that state's version of
23. See infra notes 88-137 and accompanying text (providing rn-depth review of
Buckley).
24. See infra notes 138-80 and accompanying text (analyzing Stretton and Buckley
decisions).
25. See infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text (discussing changes ABA made to
Canon 7 in 1990).
26. See infra notes 200-14 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality of 1990
Code's Canon 5 under rationale of Buckley decision).
27 See infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text (concluding that Canon 5 requires
further revision).
28. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 801 F Supp. 83, 104 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (citing PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: TI-E LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 86 (1990)), rev'd, 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993); JEFFREY
M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 16.01 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (citing
Lisa L. Milord, States Consider Adopting the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 13
JUD. CONDUCT REP., Winter 1992, at 8 for proposition that three states have adopted 1990
Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
29 See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 11.08 (discussing recent challenges to
Canon 7 on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
30. 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky 1991).
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Canon 7 unconstitutional.3" The Judicial Retirement and Removal
Commission (Commission), a state disciplinary panel, brought charges
against a state supreme court candidate for his conduct during a judicial
campaign.12 The Cominussion alleged that the candidate, Justice Combs,
improperly criticized laws prohibiting possession of handguns by felons, the
standard of review for workers' compensation cases, and the supreme
court.33 The Commission found Justice Combs guilty of most charges and
suspended him from judicial office without pay for three months.' The
Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the Canon 7 restrictions that
prohibited all discussion of judicial candidates' views on disputed legal or
political issues unnecessarily violated the candidates' free speech rights.35
The court stated that the Kentucky Legislature could rewrite Canon 7, as
31. See J.C.J.D. v R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956-57 (Ky.) (declaring Canon 7
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 70 (1991). In J.C.J.D., the Supreme Court of
Kentucky considered the validity of a Judicial Removal and Retirement Commission
(Commission) decision suspending a state supreme court justice (Combs) for violations of
Canon 7 Id. at 953-55. The J. C.J.D. court stated that the Constitution guarantees the right
of an individual to free expression and that freedom of expression extends to candidates
running for judicial office. Id. at 954-55. The court further stated that restrictions affecting
free speech which can result m disciplinary action are subject to strict scrutiny and that a
strong presumption of the unconstitutionality of such restrictions exists. Id. at 955. The
J. C.J.D. court agreed that the state has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and
objectivity of the judicial system. Id. at 956. However, the court reasoned that Canon 7
was not narrowly drawn to limit the candidate's speech to specific prohibitions, but instead
prohibited all speech. Id. The court rejected the Commission's argument that Canon 7 was
needed to prevent judges from exhibiting bias and stated that the legislature could rewrite
the Canon more narrowly, as the ABA did in 1990, to prohibit candidates from making
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues likely to come before the court. Id. at 956-57 The J.C.J.D. court
also refused to accept the Commission's finding that Combs's campaign advertisements
constituted an improper pledge of preferential treatment to one class over another. Id. at
957 Consequently, the J. C.J.D. court held that the Constitution protected Combs's speech
and ordered the Commission to dismiss the charges against him. Id.
32. See id. at 954 (discussing seven separate violations that Commission alleged Justice
Combs committed).
33. Id.
34. See id. (stating that Commission determined that Justice Combs's conduct violated
Code).
35. See id. at 956 (holding that Canon 7B(1)(c) unnecessarily violates fundamental
state and federal constitutional free speech rights of candidates because Canon prohibits all
discussion of candidates' views on disputed legal or political issues).
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the ABA had in 1990, more narrowly to prevent candidates from discussing
pending or future litigation.
36
In response to J C.J.D., the Kentucky Legislature adopted a revised
version of Canon 7 that omitted the language that the Kentucky Supreme
Court had struck down.3 7 The legislature replaced the rule that a candi-
date should not announce his views on disputed legal or political issues with
revised Canon 5's clause stating that a candidate should not make
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court.38
Later, in Ackerson v Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Commis-
sion,39 a candidate wanted to make statements that would appear to
commit the candidate regarding court administrative decisions and general
legal matters not then before the court.4 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky found that the state could not ban
promises about court administration, but upheld the state's revised ban on
36. See id. (rejecting Commission's argument that Canon 7's language is necessary to
prevent campaign statements that reflect bias in favor of one litigant over another).
37 Ky REv STAT. ANN. Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 4.300, Canon 7B(1)(c)
(Michie 1992).
38. Id.
39 776 F Supp. 309 (W.D. Ky 1991).
40. Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 776 F Supp. 309,
311 (W.D. Ky 1991). In Ackerson, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky considered whether Canon 7 violated judicial candidates' right to
freedom of speech. Id. at 313. According to the Ackerson court, while the First
Amendment applies to judicial candidates, judicial candidates are subject to a greater degree
of regulation than nonjudicial candidates. Id. However, the Ackerson court reasoned that
a state-imposed restriction on free speech must further a compelling state interest and be
narrowly drafted to avoid unnecessary abridgement of constitutional rights. Id. The
Ackerson court found that Canon 7's broad language covering pledges, promises, and
commitments on issues of court administration furthered no compelling state interest. Id.
at 313-14. At the same time, the Ackerson court upheld Kentucky's Canon 7 prohibition on
statements by a judicial candidate that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to issues likely to come before the court. Id. at 314-15. The Ackerson court found
that the state had a compelling interest in so limiting a judicial candidate's speech because
campaign comments on issues likely to come before the court tend to undermine the
fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system. Id. at 315. The legislature, the
court thought, narrowly tailored the Canon to this end. Id. Consequently, the Ackerson
court enjoined the Commission from enforcing Canon 7 to discipline candidates who made
pledges, promises, or commitments on court administrative issues. Id. at 315-16.
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statements concerning legal issues likely to come before the court.41 In
sum, the district court concluded that the Commission could not constitu-
tionally use Canon 7 to ban pledges or promises of performance in office
concerning admimstrative matters.42
Other courts likewise have struck down broad readings of Canon 7
For example, in Beshear v Butt,43 the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission (Commission) attempted to discipline a candidate for
judicial office who stated during his campaign that plea bargaining was not
acceptable to him and would not be allowed in his court.' Beshear
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas clamung that Canon 7B(1)(c) was unconstitutional both on its face
and as applied to him.45 The district court held that a federal court may
enjoin pending state administrative decisions when the state abridges free
expression.' The Commission failed to persuade the court that Monal v
Judiciary Commission,47 which upheld a Louisiana requirement that state
41. See id. at 315 (discussing enjoinder of Canon 7).
42. Id. at 315-16.
43. 773 F Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
44. See Beshear v Butt, 773 F Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (holding
Canon 7B(1)(c) unconstitutional), rev'd on other grounds, 966 F.2d 1458 (8th Cir. 1992).
In Beshear, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas considered
the constitutionality of Canon 7B(1)(c) both facially and as applied to a candidate's statement
that plea bargaining was not acceptable to him and would not be allowed in his court. Id.
at 1231. Despite the Disciplinary Commission's arguments that Canon 7 was necessary to
ensure that judges were not beholden to any interest or party, the Beshear court reasoned
that Canon 7 was substantially overbroad and vague. Id. at 1232-33. The Beshear court
stated that the Disciplinary Commission failed to persuade the court that Arkansas had an
interest in utterances that a candidate made in good faith and that were not misleading. Id.
at 1233. The Beshear court distinguished Morial v Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978), which upheld Louisiana's Canon 7(A)(3)
requirement that judges running for nonjudicial office must resign, on the ground that the
Louisiana Canon was limited by "narrow specificity " Beshear, 773 F Supp. at 1233-34.
At the same time, the Beshear court noted that Canon 7 revealed its overbreadth in
restraining statements about candidates' ideas concerning ways to cope with the increasing
crime rate. Id. at 1234. Consequently, the district court declared Canon 7B(1)(c)
unconstitutional and enjoined defendants from enforcing Canon 7B(1)(c). Id.
45. See Beshear, 773 F Supp. at 1230-31 (discussing Beshear's suit against
Commission).
46. Id. at 1232.
47 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977).
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judges running for nonjudicial elective office must resign,48 controlled in
the Beshear case. 49  The Beshear court stated that the Louisiana statute
was drawn more narrowly than Canon 7's broad prohibitions, which
encroached upon basic and fundamental speech rights.5 Consequently,
the court, citing cases such as ACLU v Flonda Bar," in which the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida struck down
Canon 7, declared Canon 7 unconstitutional on its face.52 The Beshear
48. See Morial v Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 306 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
Canon requiring judges to resign before announcing candidacy for nonjudicial office was not
violative of First Amendment or equal protection), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). In
Mortal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the validity of
Louisiana Canon 7A(3), which required a judge to resign in order to run for a nonjudicial
office. Id. at 296. According to the Mortal court, forcing Judge Morial to resign his seat
on the bench in order to run for mayor burdened a fundamental right. Id. at 301.
However, the Mortal court found that the Louisiana Canon's limited sphere of operation was
not sufficiently grievous to require the strictest constitutional scrutiny Id. at 302. Applying
a test that the court called reasonable scrutiny, the Mortal court determined that the state's
resign-to-run rule was reasonably necessary to ensure that judges were not beholden to any
interest, person, or party Id. In addition, the court addressed Judge Morial's equal
protection claims that judges running for nonjudicial office, as opposed to judges running
for judicial office or nonjudicial office holders running for nonjudicial office, were
unconstitutionally singled out for disparate treatment. Id. at 304. The Mortal court
reasoned that because the judicial office is different in key respects from other offices, the
state may regulate the judiciary with those differences in mind. Id. at 305. The court
concluded that the state legislature was entitled to some leeway in the area of regulation of
the judiciary Id. at 306. Consequently, the Mortal court held the Louisiana Canon
constitutional. Id.
49. See Beshear, 773 F Supp. at 1233-34 (distinguishing Mortal on ground that
Louisiana restriction on judges running for nonjudicial office was limited restriction).
50. See td. at 1234 (describing Canon 7B(1)(c) as "overbroad and vague").
51. 744 F Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
52. Beshear, 773 F Supp. at 1234 n.6. The Beshear opinion cited three deci-
sions-Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 763 F Supp. 128 (E.D. Pa.
1991), ACLU v Florida Bar, 744 F Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990), and J.C.J.D. v
R.J.C.R, 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 70 (1991)-in which courts found
Canon 7B(i)(c) violative of the First Amendment. Beshear, 773 F Supp. at 1234 n.6. The
Stretton case was later overruled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's decision in
Stretton); see also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (discussing J.C.J.D.).
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court entered declaratory judgment against the defendants and permanently
enjoined the defendants from enforcing Canon 7B(1)(c).5s
However, not all courts have found Canon 7 unconstitutional. In
Berger v Supreme Court,'4 a judicial candidate in Ohio sought an
injunction against the state's supreme court and other defendants to prevent
enforcement of Canon 7B(1)(c).55 The plaintiff wished to criticize what
In Florida Bar, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
considered an action challenging Florida Canon of Judicial Conduct 7B(1)(c), which
provided that candidates could not speak out on disputed legal or political issues. ACLU
v Florida Bar, 744 F Supp. 1094, 1096 (N.D. Fla. 1990). The plaintiffs claimed that
Canon 7 violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. According
to the Florida Bar court, the Florida Bar and the Judicial Qualifications Commission had a
duty to regulate the conduct of the members of the bar and judiciary Id. at 1097
However, the Florida Bar court subjected the Canon to a strict level of scrutiny because the
regulation impaired core First Amendment values. Id. The Florida Bar court recognized
that states need not treat judicial candidates the same as other candidates for elective office,
but at the same time stated that a state may not restrict a judicial candidate's free speech
rights without a compelling state interest. Id. Drawing from attorney-advertising cases, the
Florida Bar court reasoned that disclosure of information is preferable to concealment, and
the court further stated that the defendants failed to show that Canon 7 was the least
restrictive means for protecting a compelling state interest. Id. at 1098-99. Therefore, the
Florida Bar court preliminarily enjoined defendants from enforcing Canon 7B(1)(c). Id. at
1099-1100.
53. See Beshear, 773 F Supp. at 1234 (holding Canon 7 unconstitutional and citing
additional authority for proposition that Canon is unconstitutional); see also Florida Bar, 744
F Supp. at 1099-1100 (enjoining as unconstitutional enforcement of Florida Canon 7B(1)(c),
which prohibited discussion of "disputed legal or political issues").
54. 598 F Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
55. Berger v Supreme Court, 598 F Supp. 69, 71 (S.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd mem., 861
F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989). In Berger, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio considered whether to enjoin enforcement
of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7 regulating the conduct of candidates for
judicial office. Id. at 71-72. The court stated that even though Berger, ajudicial candidate,
had standing, the candidate had to show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on his claim
that Canon 7 deprived him of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech.
Id. at 74. The Berger court did not interpret Canon 7 to prohibit criticism of judicial
administrations and incumbents if such criticism was not misleading. Id. at 75. The Berger
court reasoned that the statements Berger wished to make, such as those concerning the
increase in a judge's personal involvement in the administration and resolution of court
cases, were outside the scope of Canon 7's prohibitions. Id. The Berger court held that
even under a standard of strict scrutiny, Canon 7 was necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. Id. at 75-76. The plaintiff also failed to persuade the court that Canon 7
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he believed to be deficiencies in the administration of domestic relations in
his county 56 He alleged that Canon 7 barred this criticism and thus
violated his First Amendment right to free speech and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection. 7 The District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio declared that Canon 7 was necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and therefore did not violate the First Amend-
ment.58  The court further stated that singling out judges' campaign
conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the judicial
function requires that judges be subject to different standards than
legislators and executive officers.59 Accordingly, the Berger court denied
the plaintiff's motion for a prelimnary injunction.'
Similarly, In re Kaiser6 concerned an incumbent Washington judge
whom the Supreme Court of Washington censured under Canon 7 62
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by singling out judges' campaign conduct. Id. at 76.
The Berger court stated that the purpose of the judiciary warranted the application of
different rules to judicial candidates than to legislative and executive candidates. Id.
Consequently, the Berger court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated
persuasively that he was likely to prevail on the merits on his claim that Canon 7 was
facially unconstitutional. Id.
56. See id. at 72 (listing issues that Berger wished to discuss).
57 Id.
58. See id. at 75 (noting that state has compelling interest in assuring that state's
elected judges are protected from untruthful criticism and that judicial campaigns are run
in manner upholding integrity of state judiciary).
59. Id. at 76.
60. Id.
61. 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
62. See In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 400-01 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (upholding
Canon 7 as applied to judge's statements). In Kaiser, the Supreme Court of Washington
considered whether Judge Kaiser's campaign claims that he would be a "tough no-nonsense
judge," that he would be tough on drunk driving, that his opponent's supporters were
primarily Driving While Intoxicated defense attorneys, and that he was a Democrat were
entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 394-95. According to the Kaiser court,
Kaiser's statements that a majority of his opponent's support came from drunk driving
defense attorneys violated the strict terms of Canon 7B(1)(d)'s prohibition on false and
misleading advertising. Id. However, the Kaiser court found that Kaiser's statement
concerning his opponent's supporters was entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at
397-99 Subjecting Canon 7 to exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment, the court
declared that because Kaiser uttered the drunk driving statement without knowledge of its
falsity, his statements were entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. Concerning
1094
JUDICIAL CANDIDATES' SPEECH
Kaiser had pledged to be tough on drunk driving and claimed that his
opponent's supporters were primarily Driving While Intoxicated (DWI)
defense attorneys.63 The Supreme Court of Washington, declaring that the
First Amendment protects false statements made in good faith, refused to
discipline Kaiser for misleading statements concermng his opponent's
supporters when no evidence proved Kaiser had actual knowledge of the
statement's falsity 4 However, the Kaiser court, like the Berger court,
upheld Canon 7 as applied to Kaiser's promise to be tough on DWI
offenders.6' The Kaiser court, citing Morial,6' reasoned that Kaiser's
pledge violated Canon 7 and had a direct detrimental effect on the
compelling state interest of preserving the integrity of the judiciary 67
Thus, the court concluded that the Canon's provisions were constitutionally
valid as applied to Kaiser's pledge to be tough on drunk driving.6"
Kaiser's other statements, the court reasoned that the state could restrict that speech only
if the disciplinary rule served a compelling state interest and if the state applied the rule in
a narrowly tailored fashion. Id. at 399-400. The Kaiser court held that even though
Kaiser's other statements affected core First Amendment rights, the state had a compelling
interest in upholding the good reputation of its judiciary Id. The court, in weighing the
state's interest against the judge's First Amendment rights, concluded that Kaiser's
statement that he was a "tough no-nonsense judge" referred only to his qualifications and
thus is constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 400. On the other hand, Kaiser's
statements of party affiliation, statements concerning the motives of his opponent's
supporters, and promises to be tough on drunk drivers were not a reflection on Kaiser's or
his opponent's qualifications and as such were constitutionally punishable violations of
Canon 7 Id. Consequently, the court censured Kaiser for making the offending
statements. Id. at 400-01.
63. Id. at 397
64. See id. at 398-99 (rejecting as unconstitutional application of Canon 7 to statements
concerning opponent's supporters because Kaiser had no actual knowledge of statements'
falsity when he made them).
65. See id. at 399 (reasoning that state had compelling interest in prohibiting judicial
candidates from making certain statements).
66. See Mortal v Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 306 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding
provision that required judge to resign before campaigning for nonjudicial office), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978); supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Moriao.
67 See Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 399-400 (discussing compelling state interest in regulating
judicial candidate's speech).
68. Id. at 400.
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IlI. Review of Stretton
In Stretton v Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court,69 a candidate
for state judicial office brought a civil rights action on First Amendment
grounds challenging Canon 7 of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial
Conduct."° Pennsylvania had adopted Canon 7B(1)(c) of the 1972 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct" verbatim.' Claiming that Canon 7
impeded his ability to campaign for judicial office, Stretton sought to enjoin
its enforcement.73 In his campaign, Stretton wished to point out that all
of the Common Pleas judges were Republicans and wanted to announce his
views on activist judges, criminal sentencing, changes in administrative
matters, the need for judges to hire more minority law clerks, and other
legal and political issues.74 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that Canon 7's restrictions on free
69 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
70. Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 139 (3d Cir.
1991); see Kathleen M. Sholette, Canon 7 Restrictions on the Political Speech of Judicial
Candidates: Judging Those Who Would Be Judges, 37 VILL. L. REv 139, 152-60 (1992)
(providing discussion of Stretton decision).
71. 204 PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1979).
72. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139.
73. See id. at 138 (explaining basis for Stretton's suit against Disciplinary Board).
74. Id. at 139 Stretton wished to protest the fact that county Common Pleas judges
were all Republicans. Id. In addition, he desired to announce his views on:
(a) the need for the election of judges with an "activist" view, and the obligation
of judges at every level of the judicial system to look at societal changes when
ruling on challenges to existing law;
(b) criminal sentencing and the rights of victims of crime;
(c) "reasonable doubt" and how he would apply that standard as an elected judge;
(d) the need to more closely scrutinize the work of district judges (formerly known
as justices of the peace), particularly in light of the removal of several justices in
recent years because of improper conduct;
(e) the need for various changes in judicial administration including the jury
selection process (so that panels more accurately reflect the county's racial
composition);
(f) the need for greater sensitivity toward hiring minority lawyers and law clerks,
especially by the county's judges and district attorney;
(g) plaintiff's qualifications and those of his opponents as well as a perceived need
for a woman judge; and
(h) the importance of the right to privacy as a basic constitutional right.
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speech were drastically overbroad and in violation of the First Amend-
ment.75 Noting that the ABA had adopted a new Model Code in 1990, the
district court rejected a narrow construction of Canon 7 and refused to
rewrite the Canon to make it constitutional.76
The Third Circuit, in reversing the district court, held that barring
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues
did not violate the candidates' free speech rights to the extent that the ban
covered only issues that might come before candidates as judges.' Citing
United States Civil Service Commission v National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers,7 a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Hatch Act's prohibition on federal employees' engagement in political
activity,79 the Third Circuit found that Pennsylvania had a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of its judicial systemA0 Furthermore,
75. Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 763 F Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.
Pa. 1991), rev'd, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
76. See id. at 138-39 (declaring Canon 7B(1)(c) unconstitutional).
77 See Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 143-44 (3d
Cir. 1991) (stating that narrowing construction would be consistent with theory that courts
should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties).
78. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
79. See United States Civil Serv Comm'n v National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973) (upholding Hatch Act's prohibition on federal employees'
campaign activity). In Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court considered the validity of the
Hatch Act's prohibition against federal employees taking an active part in political
campaigns. See id. at 554-64 (examining 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1988)). The Letter
Carriers Court reasoned that Congress has the power to prevent federal employees from
engaging in activities such as holding party office, working at the polls, and acting as party
paymasters. Id. at 556. The Court found that Congress and the country had an important
interest in ensuring that federal service should depend on meritorious performance rather
than political service. Id. at 557 However, the Court sought to arrive at a balance between
the interest of the individual in participating in public matters and the interest of the
government in promoting the efficiency of public services. Id. at 564. The Court found
the statute neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 568. The statute
specifically allowed employees to retain the right to vote and to express opinions on political
candidates. Id. at 575-76. Noting that the Act's restrictions were clearly stated, the Court
found that even if some provisions of the act were unconstitutionally overbroad, the
remainder of the statute covered constitutionally proscribable conduct. Id. at 580-81.
Consequently, the Court held that the Hatch Act was not facially unconstitutional. Id.
80. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142 (explaining Pennsylvania's compelling interest in
preserving confidence of public in fair hearings).
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the Stretton court noted that the duties of judges in an impartial judicial
system differ from legislative and executive duties."' In executive and
legislative areas, the public has a right to know the details of programs that
candidates propose.' In the judicial arena, however, the state has an
interest in insuring that judges provide impartial interpretations of law 13
The Third Circuit reasoned that giving the statute a narrow construc-
tion was consistent with the state interest, the Board's interpretation of the
Code, and the policy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1A Moreover,
the Third Circuit stressed the court's duty to interpret the challenged statute
to avoid constitutional difficulties.' s The Stretton court stated that the
public has the right to expect that judges will be impartial in the handling
of cases and that ajudge's taking a position on issues would inhibit, or give
the appearance of inhibiting, ajudge's ability to consider a matter impartial-
ly 6 Accordingly, the Third Circuit interpreted Canon 7 narrowly and
held that the Canon did not violate the First Amendment.'
IV Review of Buckley
In Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, the Seventh Circuit
declared Canon 7 unconstitutional.88 Illinois had adopted the wording of
ABA Canon 7, but had added a clause in an attempt to narrow the scope of
the Canon. 9 Illinois's safe harbor clause provided that a candidate could




84. See id. at 142-43 (discussing narrow interpretation of Canon that prohibits
candidate from announcing position on issue that may come before court for resolution).
85. See id. at 144 (stating that courts should interpret statutes narrowly to avoid
constitutional difficulties).
86. See id. (stating that public has right to expect that court will assess facts based on
evidence in each case and that law will be applied in manner unaffected by views of judge).
87 Id. at 146.
88. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993)
(deciding that Canon 7 was unconstitutional despite fact that rule prohibited both privileged
and unprivileged speech).
89 ILL. REV STAT. ch. 110A, para. 67B(1)(c) (1993).
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the adimmstration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on his
capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him."90
Buckley was a justice of the Appellate Court of Illinois. 9i In 1990,
he ran unsuccessfully for a seat on the state's supreme court.' During his
campaign Buckley circulated campaign literature stating that "he had never
written an opinion reversing a rape conviction. "I The Judicial Inquiry
Board filed charges against him with the Illinois Courts Commission
(Commission).94 After the election, the Commission found that Buckley
had violated Illinois Rule 67B(1)(c), but did not sanction him.' Because
Buckley had no avenue of appeal within the state court system, he turned
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 6
The district court consolidated Buckley's case with a similar case filed
by Anthony Young, who won election to the Circuit Court of Cook County
in 1992. 91 Young claimed that the risk of sanction deterred him from
speaking out on important issues.9" The district court upheld Rule
67B(l)(c) after narrowly construing the clause that a candidate "should not
announce his views on disputed legal or political issues" as limited to
statements on issues likely to come before the court.99
90. Id.
91. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225 (discussing Buckley's candidacy for judicial office).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 226.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. (stating thatIllinois Constitution provides that Court Commission's decision
is final within state court system).
97 See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 801 F Supp. 83, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(discussing consolidation of suits), rev'd, 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
98. See td. at 90-91 (discussing suit of Anthony Young). Young, who was a candidate
for the Seventh Subcircuit of the Circuit Court of Cook County, wished to express his views
on the following issues: capital punishment, abortion, the state's budget, and public school
education. Id. at 90. Young also wished to state that he would seek to ensure that everyone
was able to understand the judicial proceedings in which they were involved. Id. Even
though Young had not made such statements, he feared that Rule 67B(1)(c) would subject
him to punishment if he were to do so. Id.
99. See d. at 95-96 (upholding Canon 7 because rule furthered compelling state
interest). In Buckley, the district court stated that even though a candidate has a First
Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues, political discussion by a
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On appeal before the Seventh Circuit, the Judicial Inquiry Board
argued that the Illinois Rule was necessary to prevent judges from
committing themselves on certain issues or cases." The Board asserted
that if it allowed a judicial candidate to make statements on certain issues,
the public might perceive that the candidate, if elected, would be unable to
make impartial decisions regarding those issues.''
The Seventh Circuit responded that despite the Board's concern, Rule
67B(1)(c) was unconstitutional because the Rule was overmclusive.0 2
The court of appeals explained that the "pledges or promises" clause,
instead of applying to specific legal issues, barred all pledges or promises
except a promise that a judge, if elected, would faithfully and impartially
execute the duties of his office."" Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted,
the "announce" clause prohibited a judge from announcing "his views on
disputed legal or political issues," not from announcing how the candidate
intends to rule on a particular case or class of cases.'O°
candidate is subject to restriction by the state. Id. at 92. The district court reasoned that
its duty was to balance First Amendment rights against the state's legitimate interest in
regulating that activity Id. at 93. Noting the special function of the judiciary, the district
court adopted the magistrate's findings that the State of Illinois had a compelling interest in
regulating the judiciary so as to maintain public confidence in judicial impartiality and
integrity Id. Rejecting Buckley's reliance on ACLU v Florida Bar, 744 F Supp. 1098,
1099 (N.D. Fla. 1990), in which the court struck down Canon 7, the district court in
Buckley noted that Canon 7 could be interpreted narrowly to avoid constitutional difficulties,
as was done in Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d
Cir. 1991). Buckley, 801 F Supp. at 94-95. Therefore, the district court in Buckley upheld
Canon 7 because it was susceptible to a narrowing construction limiting it to issues that were
likely to come before the court. Id. at 95-96.
100. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993)




104. See td. (explaining scope of Canon 7). Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that the Rule served the purpose of preventing judicial candidates from committing
themselves on certain issues, the court concluded that in doing so, the Rule impermissibly
interfered with judicial candidates' free speech rights. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that
the Rule prohibited commentary on almost any issue, whether abortion, race relations,
health care reform, or even the civil war in Yugoslavia. Id. The Buckley court reasoned
that the only safe response to the Rule would be silence. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit added that nothing was wrong per se with an
overinclusive rule."ce But when the overmclusive effects of that rule
infringe on the constitutional guarantee of free speech, the rule cannot
stand."°6 The court relied on Secretary of State v Joseph H. Munson
Co. , o7 a case in which the United States Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a Maryland statute that barred charitable orgamzations, in connection
with fundraising activities, from paying expenses with more than twenty-
five percent of the amount raised.' 08 The Seventh Circuit noted that an
overinclusive rule that greatly curtails the speech "market" is deeply
problematic.'" 9 The Seventh Circuit recognized that the drafters of Rule
67B(1)(c) sought to narrow Canon 7 by adding a safe harbor clause. 1
That clause, however, did not adequately restrict the Rule because it carved
105. See d. at 229 (conceding that overinclusiveness is standard method for plugging
loopholes).
106. See td. at 228 (stating that when overinclusive rule stifles speech, then rule cannot
stand).
107 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
108. See Secretary of State v Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964-70 (1984)
(declaring statute regulating expenses of charitable organization in connection with
fundraising activity unconstitutional). In Munson, the Supreme Court considered the validity
of a state law that limited charitable organizations from paying as expenses more than 25%
of the amount raised in any fundraising activity, but authorized a waiver when the 25%
limitation would prevent the organization from raising contributions. Id. at 950. According
to the Munson Court, regardless of the waiver provision, the statute was unconstitutional
because organizations with high solicitation costs remained barred from carrying on
protected First Amendment activities. Id. at 962-68. The Court found it difficult to identify
the constitutionally proscribable conduct that the statute prohibited because the statute did
not distinguish among different fundraisers that have high costs due to protected activity
Id. at 965-66. The Court held that when a statute is so imprecise as to create an
unnecessary risk of chilling free speech, the statute is properly subject to facial attack. Id.
at 967-68. At the same time, the Munson Court stated that whether the statute regulates
before or after the fundraising is immaterial because the chill on protected activity is the
same. Id. at 968-69. Moreover, the fact that the statute limited only fundraising expenses
and not other expenses did not remedy the statute's imposition on First Amendment rights.
Id. at 969. Consequently, the Munson Court held that Maryland's fundraising statute was
unconstitutional. Id. at 969-70.
109. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229 (citing Munson, 467 U.S. at 964-68, for proposition
that state regulation may not curtail important part of speech "market").
110. See id. (discussing drafters' attempt to circumscribe scope of Canon 7); see also
text accompanying supra note 90 (providing precise wording of safe harbor clause).
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out only a small exception."' In addition, almost any statement that a
candidate made about improving the law nught cast doubt on the candidate's
capacity to decide impartially any issue that rmght come before the
candidate."' Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, the proviso failed
to grant any meaningful limitation to the Rule."'
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the district court saved the Rule by
interpreting it narrowly 14 But the court said that this interpretation did
not significantly circumscribe the Rule because it did not address the
"pledges or promises" clause, which was as broad as the "announce"
clause." 5 The Seventh Circuit strained to find any legal or political issue
that was unlikely to come before an American court." 6  The court
mentioned that even the war in Yugoslavia rmght become relevant in an
immiugration proceeding.' 7
The Judicial Inquiry Board had argued that one could read Rule
67B(1)(c) narrowly in several ways." 8 First, the Board had suggested that
111. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229 (explaining how Rule both allows and restricts same
speech).
112. See id. (explaining Rule's contradictions). The Seventh Circuit stated that under
Canon 7"
Almost anything a judicial candidate might say about "improv[ing]" the law could be taken
to cast doubt on his capacity to decide some case impartially, unless he confined himself
to the most mundane and technical proposals for law reform. If instead he announced
boldly that he did not think juries should be used in most civil cases, he could be thought
to be casting doubt on his capacity to preside impartially at civil jury trials, to rule on
motions for directed verdict in such trials, to conduct a fair voir dire, to administer the
rules of evidence in jury trials, and to decide on proposed jury instructions.
Id.
113. Id.
114. See td. (conceding that district court's interpretation was consistent with policy of
Supreme Court of Illinois, which is to interpret statutes, when possible, to sustain their
constitutionality); see also Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 442
(7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Supreme Court of Illinois adopts interpretations that save rather
than destroy state laws).
115. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229.
116. Id.
117 See id. (noting that Illinois court system had cases in which Yugoslavs challenged
deportation on ground that they faced persecution if court forced them to return to their war-
torn country).
118. See d. at 229-30 (discussing defendant's suggestions of different ways court could
read Rule narrowly).
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the Rule had an implicit right of reply "9 For example, if Justice
Buckley's opponent had accused him of being "soft" on rapists, the statute
would have allowed Buckley to reply that he had never written an opinion
reversing a rape conviction." Second, the Board had stated that the
"announce" clause was nothing more than a prohibition against forecasting
a future event, not a prohibition against making public statements. 2 1 In
other words, one should interpret "announce" in the same sense as m the
phrase "to announce a marriage.""' Third, the Board had argued that the
Rule meant nothing more than Canon 5 of the ABA's 1990 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which states that a candidate should not "make statements
that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court."'"
The Seventh Circuit responded that the defendant's argument that
Canon 7 meant nothing more than the 1990 revisions failed to mesh with the
ABA's interpretation of the 1990 revisions."24 The ABA believed that the
revisions circumscribed Canon 7, which the ABA characterized as an
"overly broad restriction on speech."'' s In addition, the Seventh Circuit
stated that the Judicial Inquiry Board was asking the court to rewrite the
Illinois Rule so that the court, in effect, would be promulgating the ABA's
revisions."' The court, citing a law review comment that advocates a
119. Id. at 229.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Buckley defendants argued that a narrow reading of the word "announce"
would confine the "announce" clause to statements in which a judicial candidate tells the
electorate how the candidate will rule on a particular case or class of cases. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 230.
124. See id. (discussing differences that ABA perceived between 1990 Model Code's
Canon 5 and 1972 Model Code's Canon 7).
125. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT app. C at 72 (Proposed Draft
1990)). The Buckley court noted that various advisory bodies on judicial ethics thought that
Canon 7 prohibited discussion of topics such as pretrial release, plea bargaining, criminal
sentencing, capital punishment, abortion, gun control, the equal rights amendment, drug laws,
gambling laws, liquor licensing, dramshop legislation, labor laws, property tax exemptions,
the regulation of condominiums, court rules, prior court decisions, specific legal questions, and
hypothetical legal questions. Id. (citing MCFADDEN, supra note 28, at 86-87).
126. See td. (stating that "saving" construction would leave Canon 7 stating one thing
and judicial gloss on it stating another).
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limited role for the judiciary, 27 stated that it was unwilling to assume such
a role."z The fact that one could apply the Rule to unprivileged speech
could not save this Rule, which also forbade privileged speech. 29
The Seventh Circuit noted that the Buckley decision created tension with
the Third Circuit's opinion in Stretton.30 The Buckley court stated that
it could reconcile the cases, although only precariously 13 After stating
that the Third Circuit's reasoning attempted to narrow Canon 7, the Buckley
court explained that the Third Circuit did not have to deal with a case in
which the Board condemned statements that merely expressed a candidate's
past record. 132 Nor did the Third Circuit have to confront the problematic
issues of a right to reply or the interpretation that the Board provided for the
"announce" clause.'33
127 James T. Barry, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 56 U. CHi. L. REv 235 (1989). In this Comment, Barry discusses the proper
role of judicial power under the Constitution:
In this context, one event often mentioned is the Framer's debate over
and rejection of a Council of Revision at the Constitutional Convention of
1787 The proposed Council would have vested the federal veto power in an
institution composed of the President and several members of the federal
judiciary, presumably the Justices of the Supreme Court. The history of this
proposal illustrates how the Framers, faced with a model of judicial involve-
ment in the lawmaking process, chose instead a judiciary that took no part in
the creation of laws. In so doing, the Framers effectively chose to preclude
the courts from deciding matters of public policy and to create a special place
for the courts in the separation of powers scheme.
Id. at 235. Barry concluded that the Framers' decision to reject the Council of Revision
should lead courts to take a unique and limited role in the constitutional scheme. Id. at
261.
128. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 230 (stating that court was unwilling to take on role of
Council of Revision).
129 Id. (citing Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964-68
(1984); Smith v Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)); see supra note 108 (discussing
Munson).
130. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 230 (attempting to distinguish Stretton decision); see
also supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text (discussing Stretton opinion).





The Seventh Circuit noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court in
J C.J.D v R.J C.R. held that a similar rule was unconstitutional."M The
Buckley court also cited various cases dealing with First Amendment limits
on free speech restrictions, but concluded that the cases in general did not
provide much guidance on the Buckley case.135 However, the court stated
that the cases do not support the proposition that a state could prohibit any
statements by a judicial candidate that one might interpret as a commitment
on a legal or political issue. 36 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that
the overbroad language of Canon 7 violated the First Amendment.
37
V Analyzing Buckley and Stretton
The Buckley and Stretton opmions' differing reasoning 13 results from
each court's views concerning both statutory interpretation 39 and civil
134. See d. at 230-31 (discussing authority for court's decision); see also supra notes
30-36 and accompanying text (discussing Kentucky court's review of Canon 7 in J. C.J.D.).
135. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 231 (citing decisions on analogous First Amendment
issues). See generally Burson v Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (upholding ban on
campaigning within 100 feet of polling place); Gentile v State Bar, I I1 S. Ct. 2720 (1991)
(holding that even though Nevada rule, as interpreted by Nevada Supreme Court, was void
for vagueness, state may constitutionally limit out-of-court comments by attorney that have
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing pending proceeding); United States v Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983) (allowing picketing of United States Supreme Court); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that judge violated right of
public to attend trial in closing trial to public without making sufficient findings to support
closure); Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating
statute that forbade newspapers to publish information concerning confidential proceedings
of state judicial disciplinary commission); United States Civil Serv Comm'n v National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding Hatch Act, which forbade civil
servants to campaign for political candidates); Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(forbidding states from preventing ideological statements in courthouse corridors); In re
Kinlem, 292 A.2d 749 (Md. 1972) (allowing judges to punish with contempt power
disruptive and incendiary statements by lawyers).
136. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 231 (concluding that prior cases provided sufficient basis
for Buckley court's declaring Canon 7 unconstitutional).
137 Id.
138. See td. at 230 (discussing Buckley opinion's tension with Third Circuit's opinion
in Stretton).
139. See Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 143-44 (3d
Cir. 1991) (discussing court's duty to interpret statute in way that upholds its constitutional-
ity). The Stretton court justified its narrow interpretation of Canon 7 by concluding that the
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rights." Applying the two cases' differing perspectives to issues that
Anthony Young wished to discuss during his campaign illustrates which of
the two opimons contains the preferable approach. 4' Young wished to
discuss capital punishment, abortion, the state's budget, and public school
education. In addition, he wished to "pledge to voters that [he would] try
to eliminate delays in the judicial process and that [he would] seek to ensure
state has a compelling interest m restricting what candidates for judicial office say in order
to prevent candidates from undermining the judicial system by making statements that affect,
or appear to affect, a judge's ability to act impartially Id. Accordingly, the Stretton court
reasoned that the court had a duty to uphold Canon 7 because the law served a compelling
state interest and the court could interpret the law to avoid constitutional difficulties. Id.
But see Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229-30 (7th Cir. 1993)
(proclaiming that court is not empowered to make such changes in statute as might be
necessary to render it constitutional). The Buckley court took a different approach to
statutory interpretation by stressing that a court should not act as a council of revision in
promulgating a constitutional rule from an unconstitutional rule. Id. at 230. The Buckley
court stated that although the court had a duty to interpret Canon 7 in a way that would
uphold its constitutionality, the court was not authorized to take on the duties of a legislative
body in attempting to do so. Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Buckley decided that the
court had a duty to avoid rewriting statutes in which the literal interpretation violated the
Constitution. Id.
140. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 227-29 (discussing judicial candidate's First Amendment
rights). The Buckley court, although realizing thatjudicial candidates do not enjoy the same
free speech rights as legislators or executive officers, stressed that a court should balance
the judicial candidate's right to free speech against the state's interest in regulating the
candidate. Id. Even though the Seventh Circuit agreed that judicial candidates have less
expansive constitutional rights than legislative or executive candidates, the court placed great
emphasis on a judge's participation in the marketplace of ideas and the importance of the
open exchange of ideas in a free society Id.
But see Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144 (discussing public's right to expect impartial
assessment of law and facts). The Stretton court focused on the state's compelling interest
in protecting citizens' rights to impartial judges and thereby shifted the issue from rights of
judicial candidates to a priority of rights for those who will appear before judges. Id. The
Third Circuit reasoned that because of judges' special positions as impartial interpreters of
the law, society has less of an interest in protecting the free speech rights of judicial
candidates. Id. at 142. Therefore, the right of citizens to have impartial judges deciding
cases buttressed the state's interest in assuring that judges remain, or appear to remain,
impartial. Id. at 142-44.
141. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 801 F Supp. 83, 90-91 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (discussing Young's wish to express his views on capital punishment, abortion, state's




that everyone is fully able to understand the judicial proceedings in which
they are involved." 143
Under a literal reading of Canon 7, Young's statement could violate the
"pledges or promises" clause in that the candidate was promising to do
something other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
his office.'" He was promising to take steps to speed up the judicial
process1 4s Moreover, his discussion of various issues such as capital
punishment would have violated the provision that a candidate should not
announce his views on disputed legal or political issues.'46
Under the Stretton dictate that a court should construe Canon 7
narrowly, Young would be unable to determine whether his speech would
constitute a violation of Canon 7B(1)(c). 47 On one hand, a judge follow-
143. See id. (explaining that Young feared that he would be subject to sanction under
Canon 7 for expressing his views).
144. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972).
145. See Buckley, 801 F Supp. at 90 (identifying Young's proposal to eliminate delays
in judicial process).
146. See E. WAYNE THODE, AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98 (1973) (discussing limits of candidates' speech under Canon 7).
Thode states:
What kind of campaign may the candidate for judicial office conduct? He
cannot campaign on a platform of partiality for specific persons or groups, nor
can he commit himself in advance on disputed legal issues, nor should he
misrepresent himself m any way The first two prohibitions in subsection
B(1)(c) come from old Canon 30; the last one was added because of instances
of misrepresentation made known to the Committee. The Committee was also
of the opinion that a candidate should not base his campaign on his view of the
solutions to disputed political issues. He can campaign on the basis of his
ability, experience, and record. Here again the tensions are obvious between the
political elective process and the desired ethical standards for the judiciary
Id.
147 See Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir.
1991) (explaining reasoning behind court's narrowing construction of Canon 7). The Third
Circuit stated:
The public has the right to expect that a court will make an assessment of
the facts based on the evidence submitted in each case, and that the law will be
applied regardless of the personal views of the judge. Taking a position in
advance of litigation would inhibit the judge's ability to consider the matter
impartially Even if he or she should reach the correct result in a given case,
the campaign announcement would leave the impression that, in fact, if not in
actuality, the case was prejudged rather than adjudicated through a proper
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Ing the Stretton decision might allow Young's promise, as the district court
did in Buckley, because speeding up the docket could be a promise to
execute faithfully the duties of office.14 However, Young could not be
certain whether a judge would determine that Young's wish to discuss
various issues such as capital punishment and abortion fall within the
Stretton court's limitation of Canon 7 to issues likely to come before the
court for resolution. 49 This uncertainty results because almost no legal
or political issue exists that judges might not address in court. 50 Thus,
even with the narrowing construction of Stretton, a judicial candidate such
as Young would have to refrain from almost any discussion of issues
because he could not be certain whether a court would determine that the
Stretton court's narrowing construction would include or exclude the
candidate's comments.' Therefore, the Stretton decision's weakness
rests not only in the lack of clarity as to how narrowly a court would read
the statute, but also in the decision's possibility of curtailing free speech
because of a candidate's doubt about what a court would allow a candidate
to say 152
Conversely, under the rationale of Buckley, the state could not restrict
a judicial candidate from making a pledge such as the one Young wished to
application of the law to facts impartially determined.
Id.
148. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 801 F Supp. 83, 91 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(agreeing with magistrate judge that Young's comments were compatible with "pledges or
promises" provision), rev'd, 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
149. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that narrowing "announce" clause to issues likely to come before court does not
circumscribe Canon 7).
150. Id.
151. See Ann V Freely, Comment, I Speak Therefore I Am: A Voice in Support of
Judicial Candidates' Right to Free Speech, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 671, 692-93 (1993)
(discussing narrowing of Canon 7 in Stretton).
152. See id. at 699 (advocating change of Canon 7). Freely's Comment states:
Candidates should not have to campaign with the apprehension that the
next sentence they utter will result in a sanction for violating the Judicial Code
of Conduct. By simply upholding the Canon on the Boards' urging that a
narrow meaning was intended, the Stretton decision has not done enough to put
these fears to rest. There should be concern that the Pennsylvania Supreme




make and could not restrict hun from discussing issues such as abortion
unless Young would compromise or appear to compromise his impartiality
in doing so. 53 Although Young wished to make a pledge or promise, his
commitment to a speedy docket would not affect his ability to decide cases
without improper bias." Consequently, the rationale of Buckley would
protect such a statement despite any prohibitions m Canon 7 because the
state would not have a compelling interest in prohibiting such a pledge. 5
In addition, the Buckley decision would allow Young to discuss issues such
as abortion and capital punishment and would permit the state to regulate
only those statements that would hinder or appear to hinder his ability to be
impartial.'56 Therefore, the refusal of the Buckley court to adopt the
narrowing construction of Stretton at least gives candidates such as Young
assurance that they may discuss political issues because the Buckley decision
in effect shifts the burden to the state to prove that a candidate's statements
would affect or appear to affect the candidate's ability to be impartial. 7
The Buckley court, by restricting regulation of speech m this fashion,
addresses the chilling effect that Canon 7's overbreadth creates. 58 The
strength of the Buckley decision rests in the court's recognition that
Canon 7's vague ban on commentary concerning disputed legal and political
issues has the effect of stifling speech even when the state has no compelling
interest in baning such speech.'59 Consequently, the Buckley court was
153. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (stating that Canon 7 goes far beyond speech that
would compromise or appear to compromise candidates' impartiality).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 231 (stating that prior cases do not support proposition that states may
circumscribe speech at slightest danger ofjudicial candidates' making statements that might
be commitments).
156. See d. (explaining that states are entitled to restrict speech of participants in
judicial process, but that process is not outside constitutional guarantees of free speech).
157 See id. at 230 (discussing how narrowing construction of Canon 7 still prohibits
privileged speech).
158. See id. at 228-29 (discussing how Canon 7 goes far beyond state's interest in
regulating speech that might compromise candidates' impartiality).
159 See MCFADDEN, supra note 28, at 86-88 (discussing confusion about range of
permissible discussion under Model Rules). McFadden notes that Canon 7's prohibition on
disputed legal or political issues has the potential to be highly restrictive of what issues a
candidate may discuss. Id. at 86-87 However, he recognizes that the Rule's scope is
unclear because different states permit different levels of discussion. Id. at 87 In addition
to Canon 7's lack of clarity, Canon 4 creates further confusion by providing that a judge
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correct m declaring Canon 7 facially unconstitutional because the statute's
speech prohibitions were not narrowly tailored to further the important state
interest of preserving the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary 160
Moreover, Young's proposed topics illustrate the type of issues that a
candidate should be able to discuss under the First Amendment. 161 The
judicial candidate's statement concerning the speed of the judicial process
is an issue of which the electorate probably would wish to be aware, and
such an issue has minimal chance of affecting or appearing to affect a
judge's impartiality 162 In theory, one could argue that Young, if he
may "speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice." Id. McFadden states that opinions are
divided over whether the speech that Canon 4 allows must cease when an election begins.
Id. He offers that one can reconcile the two sections by permitting candidates to discuss
improvements in the law so long as the candidates avoid controversies in substantive law.
Id. However, McFadden admits that so long as Canon 4 and Canon 7 conflict, candidates
will remain without guidance in an area in which candidates are concerned about knowing
the Model Code's limitations on speech. Id. at 88.
160. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing speech "market" and citing Secretary of State v Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 964-68 (1984)). But see J. Scott Gary, Comment, Ethical Conduct in a Judicial
Campaign: Is Campaigning an EthicalActivity 2, 57 WASH. L. REv 119, 134 (1981) (stating
that candidate's expression of views on disputed legal issue casts doubt on candidate's
impartiality should that issue come before candidate if elected). Gary states that by
prohibiting statements on disputed legal issues, Canon 7 falls wholly within the state's
purposes of maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary Id.
161. See Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on
Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv 207, 235 (1987)
(advocating increased speech by judicial candidates). Snyder states:
Were judicial candidates afforded the right to speak freely about their
beliefs on disputed legal and political matters and to make campaign pledges, the
public would be able to weed out those candidates whose personal views were
incompatible with the duties ofjudicial office. If candidates who made improper
statements were elected, attorneys representing clients who may be injured by
partiality would have a basis for seeking disqualification of the judge. The
prejudiced judge would be denied the opportunity to harm litigants by his refusal
to carry out his judicial obligations. The consequence of the restriction on
campaign rhetoric is to shield biased judges from public scrutiny rather than to
prevent biased judges from doing harm in office.
Id.
162. See James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election
Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671,718-22 (1989) (discussing
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makes his promise, may commit himself on the issue of speeding up the
docket and thus, for example, nught be less likely to rule impartially in a
request for a trial extension. 6 One might also argue that any statements
Young makes on issues such as abortion could make hun appear inpartial
in the eyes of the public.' However, judicial candidates' rights should
shortcomings of Canon 7). Alfim and Brooks state:
Ethical restrictions on campaign appearances and advocacy severely limit
information on judicial candidates that may be presented to the electorate. The
Code has been interpreted to prevent public debates between competing
candidates, to prohibit statements concerning a candidate's anticipated conduct
in office (other than general statements promising the faithful performance of
duties), to prevent or curtail responses to questionnaire surveys of candidates'
views and to preclude statements concerning the candidate's performance or the
performance of the candidate's opponent other than those relating to court
administration. In short, the electorate has inadequate information to judge the
judges. For these and other reasons, judicial elections have been characterized
as "quasi-elections."
Id. at 718-19 (footnotes omitted).
163. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 11.09, at 330 (discussing scope of
acceptable statements and pledges by judicial candidates according to various advisory
opinions). Shaman et al. state:
Ethics advisory opinions have addressed the propriety of numerous
statements and pledges candidates have proposed to use m the course of a
campaign. The general sense of these opinions is that anything that could be
interpreted as a pledge that the candidate will take a particular approach m
deciding cases or a particular class of cases is prohibited. It is inappropriate for
a candidate to state that he or she could personally throw the switch on anyone
convicted of a capital crime. A candidate may not express the view that
marijuana should be decriminalized or announce the candidate's views on
abortion. A candidate cannot use the slogan "a strict sentencing philosophy,"
as it gives the impression he or she would act in a biased manner in certain
cases. At least one state takes the view that statements by a candidate
concerning the use of plea bargaining should be avoided, because they may be
seen as a pledge of future conduct, and plea bargaining is a controversial
(disputed) issue.
Id. at 330-31 (footnotes omitted).
164. See MCFADDEN, supra note 28, at 89. McFadden argues that candidates
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues gives rise to two evils: "1) [Wlt
misleads the voting public into believing that these views are relevant, and thus a legitimate
basis upon which to choose between candidates; and 2) it gives the appearance that the
candidates have pre-judged the outcome of particular cases or types of cases." Id.
McFadden states that the 1990 Model Code's Canon 5 addresses only the second concern.
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not depend on whether one can conceive of a way in which candidates might
compromise their inpartiality 165
An analysis of judicial candidates' First Amendment rights should not
focus on whether the state has any conceivable interest in prohibiting judicial
candidates from making statements that commit or appear to commit them
on certain cases or issues.16 Rather, courts should allow states to
circumscribe judicial candidates' free speech rights only upon proof that a
restriction is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 167
Id. He reasons that Canon 5 fails to address the first evil because voters may believe that
candidates' discussion of views are relevant. Id.
165. See Snyder, supra note 161, at 248 (stating that Canon 7's restrictions on campaign
speech are unconstitutional). Snyder argues that even though the Code's restrictions are
intended to assure judicial impartiality, restrictions on judicial speech do not further this
goal. Id. Without clear evidence that commentary on legal or political issues has a
deleterious effect on public confidence in the judiciary or on the judiciary's impartiality, a
state cannot justify such restrictions. Id. Nor is there a compelling governmental interest
in regulating candidates forjudicial office differently from other office holders. Id. Snyder
continues thatjudicial candidates should have the same free speech rights to make improper
campaign statements or promises as other candidates for office. Id. at 248-49. Despite the
risk that a candidate will pander to obtain votes, the framers of the First Amendment
preferred full and open discussion of views. Id. at 249. Snyder states that unfortunately
the drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct did not follow the framers in relying on the
voters not to elect rascals to office. Id.
166. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing candidates' rights to participate in speech "market").
167 Id. The Supreme Court often applies a compelling state interest standard in First
Amendment challenges to statutes regulating attorney advertising and other court-related
speech. See, e.g., Peel v Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281,
2287-88 (1990) (asserting that state must prove substantial interest before regulating
attorneys' potentially misleading advertising); Seattle Times Co. v Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,
34-36 (1984) (upholding court order prohibiting dissemination of discovery material because
prohibition was in furtherance of important state interest); Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1978) (finding important state interest in regulation of attorneys'
solicitation conduct); Bates v State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding state may
regulate attorney advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading).
However, in cases concerning a trial court's regulation of certain newspaper reporting,
through the use of the contempt power, the Supreme Court has required the state to
demonstrate a "clear and present danger" of "actual prejudice or an imminent threat" before
the trial court may impose any discipline. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 571 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that court may engage in prior
restraint of press only if clear threat to fairness of trial is posed by actual publicity and if
no less restrictive means is available); Craig v Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375-78 (1947)
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For example, the United States Supreme Court in Gentile v State Bar16
held that the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of a rule regulating
lawyers' speech was void for vagueness.169 The Gentile court, however,
upheld the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test in the rule
because Nevada narrowly tailored the rule to achieve the important state
(protecting newspaper publication's attack on trial judge because publication did not
constitute clear and present danger to administration of justice); Pennekamp v Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 346-50 (1946) (holding that cartoon critical of judge was protected by First
Amendment because danger to judicial administration was not clear or immediate); Bridges
v California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941) (stating that court may not punish, using
contempt power, publication concerning pending case without showing of clear and present
danger).
168. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
169 See Gentile v State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731-45 (1991) (holding that rule
restricting attorney's speech, as Nevada Supreme Court interpreted it, was void for
vagueness, but that rule's test of "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" satisfied First
Amendment). In Gentile, the Supreme Court considered the validity of a Nevada court rule
which prohibited attorneys from making extrajudicial statements to the press that they knew
or reasonably should have known would have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding and which provided that a lawyer may state, without
elaboration, the general nature of the defense. Id. at 2723. In a divided opinion, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Kennedy, stated that the safe harbor provision of the
Nevada rule misled Gentile into thinking that he could give a press conference without fear
of discipline. Id. at 2731. Reviewing the press conference that consisted only of Gentile's
making a brief opening statement and declining to answer reporters' questions seeking more
detailed comments, the Supreme Court found support for Gentile's claim that he thought
the safe harbor clause protected his statements. Id. at 2731-32. The fact that Nevada
found Gentile in violation of the rule after Gentile made a conscious effort to comply
proved that the rule was unclear. Id. Consequently, the Supreme Court declared that the
rule as the Nevada Supreme Court interpreted it was void for vagueness. Id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court concluding that the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" test applied by Nevada and most other states satisfied the First
Amendment. Id. at 2745. The Chief Justice stated that lawyers may be regulated under
a less demanding standard than the clear and present danger of actual prejudice standard
established for regulation of the press during pending proceedings. Id. at 2742-44. The
Supreme Court balanced the state's interest in regulating lawyers against a lawyer's First
Amendment interest in the kind of speech at issue. Id. at 2745. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test in the Nevada rule was
a permissible balance between the state's interest in preserving the integrity and fairness
of a state's judicial system and an attorney's First Amendment rights. Id. Therefore, the
Gentile Court held that the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test satisfied the
First Amendment because the test was narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objective.
Id.
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objective of preserving impartial trials. 7 ' In Brown v Hartlage,7' a
Kentucky statute prohibited a candidate for county commssioner from
pledging that he would lower connissioners' salaries if elected." 2 The
United States Supreme Court held that the statute violated the First
Amendment's requirements that a compelling state interest support a speech
restriction and that a restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing
protected expression."3
Even though Canon 7 does further the important state interest of
insuring the impartiality of the judiciary, Canon 7 does not further that
interest in the narrow fashion that the Constitution requires because, as the
previous discussion shows, it has the effect of prohibiting all speech."
The Buckley court, following a rationale similar to the above cases,
therefore, properly struck down Canon 7 because the rule restricted speech
unrelated to the state's interest m prohibiting discussion that affected or
170. See id. (explaining how "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test was
narrowly tailored to further important state objective).
171. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
172. See Brown v Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 62 (1982) (holding Kentucky's use of
Corrupt Practices Act to punish candidate for County Commissioner unconstitutional). In
Brown, the Supreme Court considered the validity of Kentucky's use of the Corrupt
Practices Act to punish a candidate's statement that he would lower commissioners' salaries
if elected. Id. at 47 The Court recognized that the states have a legitimate interest in
preserving the integrity of their electoral processes. Id. at 52. However, the Brown Court
stated that the free exchange of ideas in a political campaign is central to the American
Constitution. Id. at 53. According to the Brown Court, when a state seeks to restrict
directly a candidate's speech, the First Amendment requires that the state have a compelling
interest and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected
speech. Id. at 53-54. Even though the statute had some constitutional applications, such
as prohibiting bribes, the statute reached further than the First Amendment allowed. Id. at
56-57 The Brown Court stated that Brown's statement was only his expression of the
intention to exercise public power in a way acceptable to some citizens. Id. at 57 Even
though Brown's statements were false because commissioners' salaries were fixed by law,
Brown made the statements in good faith and without knowledge of their falsity Id.
Consequently, the Brown Court held that Kentucky's nullification of Brown's election
victory was inconsistent with the First Amendment's protection of political speech. Id. at
62.
173. See rd. (declaring that Kentucky's Corrupt Practices Act violated First Amend-
ment).
174. See MCFADDEN, supra note 28, at 86-87 (describing topics thatjudicial candidates
may not discuss under Canon 7).
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appeared to affect a candidate's ability to be impartial. 75 The result the
Buckley court reached both vindicated the judicial candidate's limited rights
under the Constitution and preserved the state's interest in protecting the
judiciary's integrity and impartiality 176
The Stretton court's reasoning, by contrast, failed to assess adequately
whether Canon 7 narrowly tailored its restriction of the rights of judicial
candidates to comment on legal or political issues." This failure
stemmed from the undue emphasis that the Stretton court placed on the
interest of the public in impartial judges. 78 Whether one receives an
impartial trial is an important issue, but the Stretton court's reclassification
of the state's interest into a right of the public sidestepped the issue of
balancing judicial candidates' rights against the requirement that state's
regulation of candidates' speech be narrowly tailored in furtherance of a
compelling state interest. 179 Consequently, even though the Stretton court
attempted to narrow Canon 7 to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional,
the court's decision failed to remedy Canon 7's tendency to stifle constitu-
tionally protected speech.'10
V. Reasons the 1990 Committee Revised Canon 7
The Buckley court decided the constitutionality of only Canon 7 181
Although the Seventh Circuit made references to the ABA's 1990 revisions
to Canon 7, the Buckley court withheld comment on the constitutionality of
175. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)
(explaining how Canon 7's overbreadth has effect of prohibiting constitutionally protected
speech, even with narrowing construction).
176. See id. at 231 (explaining that states may restrict judicial candidates' speech to
preserve impartial justice under law, but that states may not circumscribe free speech at
slightest danger of candidate's appearing to make improper commitments).
177 See Stretton v Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir.
1991) (stating that Pennsylvania established compelling state interest and that court would
place narrow construction on Canon 7 to avoid constitutional difficulties).
178. See id. at 144 (explaining public's right to have judges apply law impartially).
179. Id.
180. See id. (stating that court should resort to every reasonable construction of statute
to avoid declaring statute unconstitutional).
181. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229-30 (7th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to accept argument that Canon 7 means nothing more than Canon 5).
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the ABA's new Canon 5.i8 However, before addressing how the
Buckley court would review Canon 5, a review of the changes that the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
(Committee) made to Canon 7 and the reasoning behind those changes may
be helpful in providing some background."3
182. See id. at 230 (refusing to replace Canon 7 with Canon 5, but withholding
analysis of Canon 5's constitutionality). Cf. Reynolds Cafferata, A Proposal for an
Empirical Interpretation of Canon 5, 65 S. CAL. L. REv 1639, 1666-69 (1992)
(proposing interpretation that courts should adopt when applying and reviewing Canon 5).
Cafferata proposes that if Canon 5 is to permit candidates to discuss issues, courts should
interpret Canon 5 in a way that accepts the view that judges' values and beliefs affect their
decisions. Id. at 1666. First, he states that courts should interpret Canon 5 to relax
Canon 7's restrictions on statements of philosophy Id. For example, a candidate should
be able to state under Canon 5 that he has a strict sentencing philosophy because such a
statement would provide voters with relevant information about the candidate's outlook.
Id. at 1666-67 Second, Cafferata proposes that courts should interpret Canon 5 to permit
candidates to discuss judicial philosophy Id. at 1667 For example, a candidate should
be able to tell voters that the candidate will decide cases on the basis of framers' intent.
Id. Finally, Cafferata proposes that Canon 5 should allow statements in favor of specific
legislation, but that Canon 5 should requirejudges to clarify that they must impose the law
whether they support the law or not. Id. at 1667-68. This interpretation will allow voters
to vote for candidates on the basis of candidates' judicial philosophies as disclosed through
statements on particular issues. Id. at 1668. This interpretation should answer the
criticism that Canon 7 prevents voters from obtaining relevant information. Id. Also, this
interpretation, because it allows candidates to reveal more about their judicial philoso-
phies, answers the second criticism that Canon 7 helps hide judicial bias. Id. at 1668-69.
The third criticism of Canon 7 is that it prevents candidates from being able to challenge
each other based on their campaign statements. Id. at 1669. Because this proposed
interpretation of Canon 5 allows judges to respond to their opponents, the proposed
interpretation resolves the third criticism. Id. at 1669-70. The final criticism of Canon 7
that Cafferata mentions is that it unconstitutionally chills candidates' speech. Id. at 1670.
Even though Cafferata admits that Canon 5 has its own "grey zones," he states that
because candidates will be able to speak more freely under Canon 5, that rule should have
less of a chilling effect on candidates' speech than Canon 7 Id.
183. See MILORD, supra note 19, at 46 (providing reasoning behind Committee's
decision to revise Canon 7). Milord states:
The 1990 Code Committee decided to revise Canon 7 because it failed
to provide adequate guidance regarding the political conduct of judges and
candidates, both of whom are subject to varying methods of judicial selection
in the jurisdictions. Reinforcing the Committee's decision was the observation
by a number of commentators that Canon 7 was less widely adopted than the
other Canons of the 1972 Code, and that even where adopted it was often
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The first major change that the Committee made to Canon 7B(1)(c)
was to replace the prohibition against a candidate's announcing views on
disputed legal or political issues with a narrower prohibition against
making statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies, or issues likely to come before the
court." The Committee altered this provision to align the Canon more
closely with the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech."85 At the
same time, the Committee wished to prevent statements that rmght give the
impression that judicial candidates lacked impartiality or integrity 186
Moreover, the Committee stated that Canon 7 needed revising because a
court could not practically apply the broad language of Canon 7 in its
literal terms. 1" The Committee, however, still wished to protect
candidates from the impropriety of answering questionnaires, opimon
polls, or other requests from interested persons seeking responses on
specific issues.' 88 The Committee specifically included the word "issues"
in the revised Canon to prohibit candidates from commenting on issues, as
well as cases, likely to come before them.' 89
The Committee also changed Canon 7's prohibition against making
misrepresentations into a prohibition against knowingly making misrepre-
sentations. 11 The purpose of this change was to indicate that unintention-
ignored.
Id.
184. See id. at 50 (discussing changes Committee made in 1990 Model Code). Milord
notes that "[t]he Discussion Draft's version of the rule had contained a broader prohibition
against 'stating] personal views on issues [that] may come before the court'; this rule was
replaced in the Midyear Draft with the current language." Id.




188. See id. (explaining practice of improperly questioning candidates in question-
naires and opinion polls).
189. Id.
190. See id. at 50-51 (explaining change in Canon 7B(1)(c)). The 1990 Model Code's
Canon 5 also limited the scope of misrepresentations covered by Canon 7 by no longer
making the Canon applicable to all facts. At the same time, Canon 5 extended the scope
of the provision by making the Canon applicable to statements about opponents as well
as to statements about oneself. Id.
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al misrepresentations would not constitute a violation of the Code. 9, The
1990 Code also included a new section 5A(3)(e) that permitted candidates
to respond to attacks as long as those responses did not violate any other
provisions of Canon 5 19 The Committee reasoned that tus section was
necessary to allow candidates to respond to attacks on their personal and
professional lives."93 In addition, the Committee added a new paragraph
of commentary to explain candidates' duties to avoid making improper
comments on cases or controversies likely to come before their respective
courts.194 Other new commentary contains cross-references to Canon
3B(9), the section regarding public comment by judges, and Rule 8.2 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires lawyers who
are judicial candidates to comply with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 195
191. Id. at 50; see In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 398-99 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (explaining
that state could not constitutionally regulate misrepresentations that candidate made without
knowledge of statements' falsity).
192. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(e) (amended 1990). Can-
on 5A(3)(e) states that a candidate "may respond to personal attacks or attacks on the
candidate's record as long as the response does not violate Section 5A(3)(d)." Id.
193. See MILORD, supra note 19, at 51 (explaining reasoning behind addition of
Canon 5A(3)(e)).
194. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) cmt. (amended 1990). The
commentary states:
Section 5A(3)(d) prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making
statements that appear to commit the candidate regarding cases, controversies or
issues likely to come before the court. As a corollary, a candidate should
emphasize in any public statement the candidate's duty to uphold the law
regardless of his or her personal views. See also Section 3B(9), the general rule
on public comment by judges. Section 5A(3)(d) does not prohibit a candidate from
making pledges or promises respecting improvement in court administration. Nor
does this Section prohibit an incumbent judge from making private statements to
other judges or court personnel in the performance of judicial duties. This Section
applies to any statement made in the process of securing judicial office, such as
statements to commissions charged with judicial selection and tenure and
legislative bodies confirming appointment. See also Rule 8.2 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
Id.
195. See id. Canon 3B(9) (explaining adjudicative restrictions of judge's speech). Canon
3B(9) states:
A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court,
make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome
or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially
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The Committee did not substantially revise the first part of Can-
on 7B(1)(c), which bars pledges or promises other than promises to
faithfully or impartially perform the duties of the office. 116  The 1990
drafters altered only the phrase "should not make pledges or promises" to
"shall not make pledges or prormses."' 9  The reporter for the 1990
Judicial Code did not explain why this provision was readopted.198 The
failure to revise or to provide explanation for the. Committee's retention of
the "pledges or promises" clause may be detrimental to the new Canon 5
because courts such as the Buckley court have found this section to be
unconstitutionally overbroad.199
VIL The Constitutionality of the New Canon 5
According to the Buckley court, a literal interpretation of the "pledges
or promises" clause restricts judicial candidates from making any promises
other than one-that they will perform their judicial duties faithfully 2
Other commentators have expressed similar doubt about the potential scope
of this section."0 The drafters' minor alterations to this section do not
interfere with a fair trial or hearing. The judge shall require similar abstention on
the part of court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This
Section does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of
their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the
court. This Section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is a litigant
in a personal capacity.
Id., see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2 (1993) (requiring lawyers who
are judicial candidates to comply with Code of Judicial Conduct).
196. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972).
197 Id. Canon 5A(3)(d) (amended 1990).
198. See MILORD, supra note 19, at 50-51 (noting failure of reporter to provide
information about "pledges or promises" clause within Canon 5 discussion).
199. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Canon 7 unconstitutionally prohibits all pledges or promises except two);
Ackerson v Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 776 F Supp. 309, 313-14
(W.D. Ky 1991) (holding "pledges or promises" clause unconstitutional as applied to
pledges concerning court administration).
200. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (stating that Canon 7 prohibits all pledges or
promises except promise that candidate will faithfully and impartially discharge duties of
judicial office).
201. See MCFADDEN, supra note 28, at 90 (discussing "pledges or promises" clause).
McFadden states:
1119
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1085 (1994)
address complaints of the Buckley court or other commentators about the
overbreadth of the "pledges or promises" clause. 2' In Buckley, the
Seventh Circuit indicated that a literal construction of this clause infringes
upon a judicial candidate's First Amendment rights because it restricts
pledges or promises even when the state has no compelling interest in
prohibiting that speech.2 3 Consequently, the "pledges or promises"
clause of the 1990 Code remains unconstitutional under the rationale of the
Buckley court because the drafters failed to narrow the provision to serve
a compelling state interest.2"
On the other hand, the Committee's rejection of the ban on discussion
of disputed legal or political issues in favor of a rule that candidates shall
not make commitments with respect to cases, controversies, or issues
likely to come before them205 should pass muster under Buckley 206
Because the Canon 7 prohibition encompassed such a wide range of
topics, the Buckley court declared that the provision violated a judicial
candidate's First Amendment rights.20 7 This portion of the 1990 Code
represents one of the major changes to the 1972 Model Code and
addresses many of the Seventh Circuit's doubts about the constitutionality
On the other hand, the restriction on promises of conduct in office is not
quite so stringent as its language implies. Read literally, the rule prohibits any
promise other than the "faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office." A candidate in Alabama reasonably asked, "Is nothing elsepermissible?
If so, please give examples of what a judicial candidate can say at political
rallies." The advisory commission was clear that campaign speeches were not
limited to a simple recitation of the code-blessed promise, but refused to give
concrete examples of what more is permitted.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701, 705 (Kan. 1975) (holding that
various promises made by judicial candidate concerning quality and quantity of work in
district court all related to faithful and impartial performance of judicial office).
202. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228.
203. See td. (explaining that only safe response to Canon 7 is silence).
204. See td. at 228-29 (describing how "pledges or promises" clause violates First
Amendment).
205. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (amended 1990).
206. See Buckley v Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that court would not, in effect, rewrite Canon 7 to limit it to Canon 5's scope).




of the 1972 version of Canon 7B(1)(c).2 °8 The 1990 Code states more
accurately the ultimate goal of the etlucal restriction on certain campaign
speech: to prevent judges from committing themselves on issues likely to
come before their courts.2' The Buckley court reasoned that Canon 7
failed to achieve a compelling state interest in instances in which the rule
prevented judges from commenting on disputed political issues even
though those comments did not place in doubt the judges' abilities to
decide issues impartially 210 Thus, the new provision should be facially
constitutional under Buckley because the ABA narrowly tailored the 1990
rule to serve a compelling state interest.2 '
Although neither the Buckley court nor the Stretton court addressed
the constitutionality of the third clause of subsection B(1)(c), the Washing-
ton Supreme Court in In re Kaiser stated that a judicial candidate could
not constitutionally be disciplined for making statements that the candidate
was unaware were false. 21 2 Therefore, changing the phrase "nusrepre-
sent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact" to
"knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or
other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent" should insulate this
section from constitutional attack.21 3 Moreover, this change improves
upon the fairness of Canon 7 because it prevents a disciplinary board from
disciplining a judicial candidate for misrepresentations that the candidate
mistakenly made.21 4
208. See MILoRD, supra note 19, at 50-51 (providing reasoning behind changes made
to 1972 Model Code's Canon 7 in 1990 Model Code's Canon 5).
209. See Cafferata, supra note 182, at 1671 (explaining that first goal of Canon 5 is to
maintain impartiality and integrity of judges).
210. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (stating that Canon 7 reaches far beyond speech that
would compromise or appear to compromise impartiality of candidate).
211. See id. at 231 (providing that state may regulate judicial candidates' speech to
ensure impartial justice under law, but process must remain subject to First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech).
212. See In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 398-99 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (holding that
Commission could not constitutionally punish candidate for statements that candidate
reasonably thought were true).
213. See zd. (discussing constitutional protection of candidate's false statements).
214. See MILORD, supra note 19, at 50-51 (stating that Committee thought insertion of
knowledge criterion was appropriate to indicate that unintentional misrepresentations would
not constitute misconduct).
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VIII. Conclusion
While the Buckley and Stretton decisions represent a split in the
federal appellate courts over the constitutionality of Canon 7, the ABA's
adoption of Canon 5 in 1990 may usher in a new series of court challeng-
es to the constitutionality of this rule.2"5 Although the drafters of
Canon 5 sought to remedy the constitutional problems of Canon 7,
Canon 5 does not address all of the concerns of the Buckley court.216
Therefore, the drafters should further revise the "pledges or promises"
clause of Canon 5 so that it will be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest.21 7 States wishing to insulate Canon 5 from a
successful Buckley attack should exclude the "pledges or promises"
clause.218 A constitutional Canon 5 would read:
A candidate for judicial office shall not (i) make statements
that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court; or (ii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications,
present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an
opponent.
219
Passing this limited version of Canon 5 should not detract from states'
abilities to discipline candidates who make improper promises because the
state could still discipline those candidates under the prohibition against
candidates' committing themselves on issues likely to come before them
for resolution."2 Moreover, this proposed Canon 5 vindicates judicial
215. See supra notes 181-99 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of 1990 Model
Code's Canon 5).
216. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text (evaluating constitutionality of
Canon 5 under rationale of Buckley).
217 See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text (explaining Buckley court's criticism
of "pledges or promises" clause).
218. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (questioning constitutionality of
"pledges or promises" clause).
219. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (amended 1990) (omitting
subsection (i)).
220. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (discussing how Canon 5's




candidates' First Amendment rights, the exercise of which ensure that
voters are able to make informed choices injudicial elections.ni
Robert M. Brode
221. See Cafferata, supra note 182, at 1659 (discussing voters obtaining relevant
information). Cafferata states:
If Canon 5 is to succeed in its goal to recognize the reality that judges
must be elected, it should provide candidates with a means to get relevant
information to voters. By allowing candidates to talk about some of the political
issues, Canon 5 increases the likelihood that voters will retain information m
judicial elections in two ways. First it allows judges to engage in discourse
appropriate for a campaign-a discussion of the issues. Voters will assimilate
information about judges if it conforms with their maps or expectations about
campaigns. Second, the canon will encourage judges to discuss issues that other
candidates face. If judges discuss contemporary political issues that nonjudicial
candidates are already discussing, this too will facilitate voter retention of




I oti II Vtp

